REGIONAL SPORTS NETWORKS, COMPETITION, AND THE CONSUMER
Diana Moss* I. INTRODUCTION n an economy increasingly characterized by complex business relationships, Regional Sports Networks (RSNs) are no novelty. There are now about 40 such entities in the U.S., the oldest of which is the Madison Square Garden Sports Network (MSG). Launched in 1969, MSG bffers programming for the New York Knicks (NBA), New York Rangers and Buffalo Sabres (NHL), New York Liberty (WNBA), and New York Red Bulls (MLS). 1 Arguably, the centerpieces of the RSN industry in the U.S. are the two large, rival families of RSNs controlled by Comcast SportsNet (CSN) and Fox Sports Net (FSN) 2 CSN operates eight RSNs while FSN controls almost i8 networks that offer sports programming for a variety of individual U.S. cities and regions.
The prominent role of media in sports likely accounts for the ownership interests of multi-channel video programming distributors (MVPDs) in many RSNs. MVPDs include cable and Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) providers. RSNs are hugely air because the Twins failed to negotiate deals with local area cable or DBS distributors. 7 Twins programming returned to the local FSN network.
Vertical relationships involving sports-related multi-video programming (MVP) link up the media rights holders (i.e., the teams) with the. RSN, which purchases the rights to transmit the events: The RSN then coordinates with and jointly markets the programming to MVPDs who offer it in turn to subscribers in the form of sports channels and other premium sports packages. These relationships can range from ownership through merger or acquisition, to contractual agreements with exclusive terms and conditions, to simple buyer-seller relationships.
Partial ownership structures are common for RSNs. For example, Comcast has a 20 percent ownership interest in SportsNet Chicago (which replaced the defunct FSN Chicago), along with Cubs (MLB) owner the Tribune Company (20 percent share) and the White Sox (MLB) and Bulls (NBA) owner, Jerry Reisendorf (40 percent share). The CSN Bay Area is jointly owned by Comcast (45 percent), Fox (30 percent), and the San Francisco Giants (25 percent). Other RSNs are joint ventures that do not include MVPD ownership. The New England Sports Network (NESN), for example, is a joint venture between the Boston Bruins (NHL) and Red Sox (MLB). Also consider the controversial Mid-Atlantic Sports Network (MASN), which is coowned by MLB rivals the Baltimore Orioles and Washington Nationals. ' RSNs raise threshold competition policy issues because of the unique structure of the markets involved. Rivalry at one or more levels in the chain of vertical integration involving sports teams, RSNs, and MVPDs is often limited, if not nonexistent. Under these circumstances, changes in control that create or strengthen vertically-integrated content/distribution platforms warrant a rigorous level of scrutiny by antitrust and regulatory ("In an era when the potential on-the-field fortunes of baseball teams rise or collapse with the size of the television contracts they can negotiate off the field, the Nationals have suffered a major financial setback whose relative and absolute dimensions will almost certainly worsen over time unless the outrageous, back-stabbing deal is reversed.").
agencies.
This article sets forth the various scenarios for vertical arrangements involving RSNs that potentially raise competitive and consumer problems.. Central to the analysis are the unique issues surrounding the demand for sports programming and market definition surrounding those markets. This article also notes that while there are no antitrust exemptions involving relationships between professional league sports and MVPDs, other sports-related immunities might be argued to apply to RSNs.
Fact situations in RSN markets can vary substantially, so there are no simple answers to the foregoing questions. But it is possible to frame the major questions they raise for competition policy. The article proceeds in Section II with some brief background material on markets for sports MVP. Section III then discusses potential horizontal and vertical competitive issues that may arise in such markets. Section IV considers important questions that are specific to markets for sports MVP that can bear on antitrust analysis. Set forth in section V is a discussion of the applicability of certain sports-related immunities to RSNs and MVPDs. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications that competitive issues surrounding sports MVP markets have on antitrust and regulatory policy.
MARKETS FOR SPORTS MVP
There are a number of possible scenarios involving markets for local sports programming. Two scenarios, however, are most likely to be encountered. One scenario is a single, unintegrated RSN in the upstream media rights market and competing cable and/or satellite providers in the downstream MVPD market (Figure i) . A second scenario (Figure 2) RIVAL RSNs AND MVPDs
The scenario shown in Figure 2 prompts a number of questions. One is the extent to which consumers have access to both cable and DBS modes of MVPD, since different RSN programming can be carried on rival MVPD providers. The ability of consumers to switch MVPD providers in response to programming prices, content, and quality is an important feature in markets with multiple RSNs. DBS continues to be slightly less available in certain markets that are served by cable. Another question is the extent of competition in the upstream market for sports media rights, which arguably influences the number of RSNs that potentially operate in any given region. Table i lists U.S. RSNs that carry programming for professional sports and the regions they cover as of the writing of this article. There are a total of 15 RSNs nationwide, serving 28 regional markets. Seven markets contain two or more RSNs, including: New York City (three), Kansas City (two), the MidAtlantic region (two), Ohio (three), New England (two), the Rocky Mountain region (two), and the Northwest (two). Because the demand for sports programming is driven in large part by fan loyalty, however, it is not clear to what extent RSN packages actually compete, despite the apparent choices in programming that are evident in many of the markets served by multiple RSNs.
COMPETITIVE ISSUES INVOLVING RSNs AND MVPDs
Mergers or contractual agreements involving RSNs and MVPDs can fundamentally alter the incentives and abilities of market participants, potentially affecting prices, output, choice, and innovation in both programming and distribution. While the focus here is primarily on vertical arrangements, it is helpful to review the horizontal issues that can arise in RSN and MVPD markets. 6 For example, does the aggregation, coordination, and joint marketing function performed by a single RSN eliminate competition in the upstream media rights market? If it does, then the RSN could restrict programming output and raise prices to MVPDs. The answer'to this query, of course, largely depends on whether individual team programming competes for the viewership of local fans or, in the alternative, whether the RSN performs a valuable economic integration function for a series of individual team "monopolies," each with no good substitutes. [ Figure 2 , for example, the merger of two independent RSNs could produce a more powerful entity with a greater ability to make demands on downstream MVPDs.
This includes placement on an MVPD's standard tier and/or a per customer charge that would be passed on to subscribers. The rumored combination of the YESN and NESN in 2004 potentially raised this issue." A merger of unintegrated local cable providers that creates significant market share, on the other hand, might enhance buyer market power. The likely competitive effects of these scenarios depend on a variety of factors, including the structure of upstream and downstream markets, the degree of vertical integration, consumer preferences, and any relevant efficiencies. The preponderance of vertical integration involving RSNs (e.g., joint-ownership by teams and MVPDs), however, bears strongly on competitive judgments involving horizontal integration such as the merger of two cable companies.
Vertical integration or contractual arrangements that mimic a merger between RSNs and MVPDs pose the classic double-edged sword for competition and consumers-the balancing of efficiencies against potentially restricted output, higher prices, reduced choice, and less innovation resulting from the exercise of market power.
There are three potential categories of economies that might result from such integration. One is lower transactions costs for the merged firm due, for example, to: (i) eliminating price negotiations for certain services and (2) avoiding the haggling between stakeholders about how to divide the proceeds of sports media productions. A second source of savings is investment in equipment that can be used in joint production of sports and non-sports programming.
Finally, integration can eliminate double margins (i.e., successive markups) associated with imperfectly competitive up and downstream markets.
At the same time, consolidation that creates a verticallyintegrated content/distribution platform or exclusive agreements involving an unintegrated RSN and MVPD can have potentially anticompetitive effects. 18 For example, consider a merger between the RSN and cable provider in Figure I . Such a combination potentially creates the ability and incentive for the firm to adversely affect market outcomes by foreclosing the rival DBS supplier from access to RSN programming (i.e., input foreclosure) or to engage in conduct that would otherwise raise its rival's costs by charging more for programming or lowering the quality of such programming in a way that could inhibit the MVPD's ability to compete.' 9 A merger or exclusive agreement between an RSN and DBS supplier in Figure 2 poses the additional possibility that the merged entity could deny or frustrate the rival RSN access to placing programming on its MVP system (i.e., customer foreclosure). The foregoing types of input and customer foreclosure or raising rivals' costs strategies are typically considered in vertical arrangements involving upstream input and downstream output suppliers. 20 The integrated firm's ability to foreclose or raise rivals' costs stems from the control of RSN programming. Incentive turns on whether frustrating or denying access is a profitable strategy. For example, the integrated or contractuallyrelated firm must offset the lost programming revenue from rival MVPDs with a revenue gain from its own sales of sports programming at supra-competitive prices. This cost/benefit analysis depends on the structure (i.e., market shares and concentration) in upstream and downstream markets.
Consider now a merger of the two cable providers (one with an existing interest in an RSN) in Figure 3 . Such a combination might increase the firm's incentive to adversely affect market outcomes. With a greater share of the downstream MVPD market, the merged company might find it profitable to deny or frustrate the rival DBS supplier's access to the programming of its integrated RSN affiliate or otherwise raise its [VOL. 2 I1: 1 costs, thus impairing the firm's ability to compete in the downstream market. Alternatively, the larger post-merger MVPD might have more incentive to foreclose the competing RSN from access to the merged company's MVPD as a customer.
Likewise, the merger of the two competing RSNs in Figure 3 (one with an existing interest in a MVPD) could increase the ability of the merged entity to adversely affect market outcomes. With a control over all RSN programming in the market, foreclosure of the rival MVPD is more viable. The exclusionary conduct embodied in foreclosure is problematic because it narrows the field of options for rivals in their respective markets. Depending on the type of foreclosure, such diminished competition can increase the prices at which RSN programming is sold to MVPDs and/or those charged to subscribers of MVP services.
Consumers' ability to switch to competing MVPDs to avoid subscription price increases or degradation in programming quality is a key factor in determining whether mergers or exclusive agreements involving RSNs and MVPDs can harm consumers. These issues have arisen in a number of cases, including the Federal Communication Commission's decision in Fox's proposed acquisition of DirecTV 21 and the Federal Trade Commission's investigation into Comcast and Time Warner Cable's proposed acquisition of the cable assets of Adelphia.
IMPORTANT FACTORS IN EVALUATING COMPETITIVE ISSUES
Competition analysis under both antitrust and regulatory standards typically looks at a number of factors: market definition and structure (i.e., market shares and concentration), competitive effects, the role of entry, and merger-related efficiencies. Two of these factors are likely to stand out in assessing competitive outcomes in sports-related MVP-market definition in upstream media rights and downstream MVPD markets and the role of consumer-related efficiencies.
MARKET DEFINITION
Market definition is the first and often most important step in antitrust analysis. A "relevant" market for antitrust purposes is the smallest group of products (in a geographic area) that consumers could switch to in order to avoid a price increase by a "hypothetical" monopolist. Market definition therefore asks what products consumers view as good substitutes. If consumers can switch to other available products, then it would be harder for any single seller or group of sellers to profitably increase prices. 23 
For example, is programming for the local baseball team a good substitute for local hockey? Is programming for one local baseball team a viable substitute for a rival local baseball team, as in the case of the Yankees and Mets in New York or the Dodgers and Angels in Southern California? If not, then the media rights for each team are effectively individual monopolies and joint marketing would not eliminate competition. 2 4 Alternatively, if programming for individual teams offered by an RSN does compete for the viewership of local fans, joint marketing through an RSN eliminates such competition and could result in restricted or lower quality programming and higher prices to MVPDs.
Decisions in a number of antitrust cases, including USFL v. NFL, indicated that the most important sports constitute separate markets." Under such circumstances, an RSN such as CSN Chicago that coordinates the rights for multiple differentsports teams may not raise competitive concerns. However, RSNs like MASN and FSN West that jointly market the rights of the rival Orioles and Nationals and the Dodgers and Angels, respectively, may be problematic.
In downstream markets, the relevant antitrust question is how MVP subscribers view RSN products offered through different MVPDs. For example, do consumers consider different RSN channels and packages sold by local cable and satellite providers to be effective substitutes? This may be the case in the larger metropolitan areas that host the multiple RSNs shown in Table i . And in what instances do sports channels compete with other forms of non-sports premium programming?
In downstream markets, the FTC has made both of the foregoing determinations-i.e., that premium sports channels comprise a 24 Most RSNs provide coverage of local or sports teams within or near a major metropolitan with strong fan loyalty and support. A local MVPD would be unlikely to consider sports-related MVP offered by non-local RSNs a good substitute.
2 See, e.g., USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d I335 (1988 market and that premium pay television programming comprises the relevant market.
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Based on the foregoing, consolidation of RSNs in a "premium sports channel" market could pose competitive problems while under a broader market definition (e.g., all premium pay programming), it would not. Market definition is, and will likely continue to be a controversial part of competitive analysis involving sports-related MVP, particularly with ongoing changes in how sports programming is marketed, with larger numbers of channels offered in basic packages and sports and non-sports programming bundled together as part of premium services.
CONSUMER ISSUES
Because of the intense popularity of and role of fan loyalty in driving demand for sports programming, the competitive analysis of sports-related MVP is likely to consider other factors that could bear on enforcement decisions involving integration or contractual relationships. First, MVP subscribers may place a higher value on convenience and quality than they do on price. This characteristic of consumer demand creates tensions for the desirability of certain market structures that would be achieved through mergers or agreements involving RSNs and MVPDs. For example, fans might willingly pay a supracompetitive price to avoid the service interruptions that could occur because of disruptive bargaining. Such problems could arise between rival RSNs over the media rights to individual or groups of teams or between multiple RSNs and MVPDs in a geographic market.
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Under the foregoing circumstances, arrangements or outcomes that place local sports programming with a single RSN could provide benefits to consumers. [VOL. 2 1: ."1 Second, placing RSN's sports programming with an MVPD in an exclusive arrangement could arguably allow the firms to differentiate themselves from a competing sports content/distribution (i.e., RSN/MVPD) platform in the market. This type of "systems" competition could allow rival RSN/MVPD platforms to compete more effectively. 2 8 Both of these potential pro-consumer scenarios involving vertical relationships between RSNs and MVPDs should, however, be considered in light of the fact-patterns in specific cases.
For example, horizontal integration between MVPDs (as in the case of ComcastlTime Warner/Adelphia), if superimposed on exclusive arrangements between unintegrated RSNs and MVPDs may renew or intensify the bargaining over the share of profits that are divided between the various stakeholders. This increases the likelihood of service disruptions that inconveniences fans and viewing audiences.
Multiple offerings between rival RSNs, each with exclusive agreements with cable and DBS providers, could also force consumers to invest in different or additional equipment and pay for bundled packages that include redundant sports programming. 9 The weight given to the foregoing considerations in antitrust analysis will depend largely on the magnitude of potential competitive harm raised by various transactions. More competition in popular sports channels and packages offered through RSNs is very much in the interest of MVPDs whogiven strong viewership for the team-specific programming that is offered by different RSNs-would find ready customers. Moreover, promoting competition at both the RSN and MVPD levels is likely to ensure that prices are low, and that consumers are afforded choice in sports-related programming. baseball. 4 Arguably, the joint marketing of rights through RSNs is no more the business of baseball than is running a parking lot adjacent to the stadium.
The broadcast exemption is also not easily extended to RSNs. Here again, several attempts to expand coverage of the SBA to MVPD have failed. 3 " The SBA deals with collective sales of rights or joint contracting by a league, not to sales of individual rights by local team owners or to the resale of rights by a rights purchaser (e.g., an RSN). Moreover, major federal cases have construed the applicability of the SBA to "sponsored telecasting" to apply narrowly to over-the-air television broadcasting. This means it would not affect negotiations with cable or satellite providers by entities controlling the media rights.
IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST AND REGULATION
The foregoing analysis of competitive issues in sports programming markets highlights two major policy issues. First, MVPD markets have benefited by continued penetration of DBS. But cable mergers that increase incentives to foreclose rival MVPDs from affiliated RSN programming could quickly reverse those gains. Competition will therefore benefit from continued close monitoring and scrutiny of cable consolidation.
In problematic cases, divestiture can reduce cable market power. And regulatory policy initiatives and directives that promote the continued penetration of DBS and compel carriage of independent programming should be promoted.
Second, the lack of close substitutes created by fan loyalty to particular local teams can have significant implications for competition in MVPD markets. This unique feature of demand for sports programming will affect whether joint marketing of rights through RSNs creates competitive problems. It also will affect outcomes of vertical relationships between MVPDs and RSNs and mergers or either downstream MVPDS or upstream RSNs in the presence of vertical arrangements. Exclusive agreements that foreclose competing MVPDs from access to RSN programming could impose significant switching or duplication costs on consumers who are forced to invest in multiple services to get the programming they want.
The foregoing issue highlights the growing dichotomy between cable-based and DBS-based MVPD systems. In this case, maintenance of "systems competition" is heavily dependent on robust upstream media rights and downstream MVPD markets and open and unfettered MVPD access to local sports programming.
Exclusive agreements or mergers that limit MVPD access to programming undercut the benefits of growing, head-to-head competition between cable and DBS. 
